AutoLock: Why Cache Attacks on ARM Are Harder Than You Think by Green, Marc et al.
AutoLock: Why Cache Attacks on ARM Are Harder Than You Think
Marc Green
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Leandro Rodrigues-Lima
Fraunhofer AISEC
Andreas Zankl
Fraunhofer AISEC
Gorka Irazoqui
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Johann Heyszl
Fraunhofer AISEC
Thomas Eisenbarth
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Abstract
Attacks on the microarchitecture of modern processors
have become a practical threat to security and privacy
in desktop and cloud computing. Recently, cache at-
tacks have successfully been demonstrated on ARM
based mobile devices, suggesting they are as vulner-
able as their desktop or server counterparts. In this
work, we show that previous literature might have left
an overly pessimistic conclusion of ARM’s security as
we unveil AutoLock: an internal performance enhance-
ment found in inclusive cache levels of ARM proces-
sors that adversely affects Evict+Time, Prime+Probe,
and Evict+Reload attacks. AutoLock’s presence on
system-on-chips (SoCs) is not publicly documented, yet
knowing that it is implemented is vital to correctly as-
sess the risk of cache attacks. We therefore provide a de-
tailed description of the feature and propose three ways
to detect its presence on actual SoCs. We illustrate how
AutoLock impedes cross-core cache evictions, but show
that its effect can also be compensated in a practical at-
tack. Our findings highlight the intricacies of cache at-
tacks on ARM and suggest that a fair and comprehen-
sive vulnerability assessment requires an in-depth under-
standing of ARM’s cache architectures and rigorous test-
ing across a broad range of ARM based devices.
1 Introduction
The rapid growth of mobile computing illustrates the
continually increasing role of digital services in our daily
lives. As more and more information is processed digi-
tally, data privacy and security are of utmost importance.
One of the threats known today aims directly at the fab-
ric of digital computing. Attacks on processors and their
microarchitecture exploit the very core that handles our
data. In particular, processor caches have been exploited
to retrieve sensitive information across logic boundaries
established by operating systems and hypervisors. As
caches speed up the access to data and instructions, tim-
ing measurements allow an adversary to infer the activity
of other applications and the data processed by them. In
fact, cache attacks have been demonstrated in multiple
scenarios in which our personal data is processed, e.g.,
web browsing [28] or cloud computing [17, 39]. These
attacks have severe security implications, as they can re-
cover sensitive information such as passwords, crypto-
graphic keys, and private user behavior. The majority of
attacks have been demonstrated on classic desktop and
server hardware [16, 21, 29, 34], and with Intel’s market
share for server processors being over 98% [22], their
platforms have been targeted most frequently.
With mobile usage skyrocketing, the feasibility of
cache attacks on smartphone and IoT processors – which
are predominantly ARM-based – has become a rele-
vant issue. Attacks that rely on the existence of a
cache flush instruction, i.e., Flush+Reload [34] and
Flush+Flush [14], work efficiently across a broad range
of x86 processors, but have limited applicability on ARM
devices. In general, cache flush instructions serve the
legitimate purpose of manually maintaining coherency,
e.g., for memory mapped input-output or self-modifying
code. On any x86 processor implementing the SSE2
instruction set extension, this flush instruction is avail-
able from all privilege levels as clflush. A similar in-
struction was introduced for ARM processors only in the
most recent architecture version, ARMv8. In contrast to
clflush, it must be specifically enabled to be accessi-
ble from userspace. This leaves a significant number of
ARM processors without a cache flush instruction.
For all processors with a disabled flush instruction or
an earlier architecture version, e.g., ARMv7, only evic-
tion based cache attacks can be deployed. In particular,
these attacks are Evict+Time [29], Prime+Probe [29],
and Evict+Reload [15]. On multi-core systems, they
target the last-level cache (LLC) to succeed regardless of
which core a victim process is running on. This requires
the LLC to be inclusive, i.e., to always contain the con-
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tents of all core-private cache levels. On Intel processors,
the entire cache hierarchy fulfills the inclusiveness prop-
erty and is therefore a viable target for eviction based
attacks. ARM devices, on the contrary, implement inclu-
sive and non-inclusive caches alike. Both properties can
co-exist, even in the same cache hierarchy. This renders
eviction based attacks to be practicable only on a limited
number of devices, in particular those that implement
inclusive last-level caches. Yet, our findings show that
an internal performance enhancement in inclusive last-
level caches, dubbed AutoLock, can still impede evic-
tion based cache attacks. In short, AutoLock prevents
a processor core from evicting a cache line from an in-
clusive last-level cache, if said line is allocated in any
of the other cores’ private cache levels. This inhibits
cross-core LLC evictions, a key requirement for practi-
cal Evict+Time, Prime+Probe, and Evict+Reload at-
tacks on multi-core systems, and further limits the num-
ber of ARM based attack targets in practice.
In literature, Lipp et al. [25], Zhang et al. [36], and
Zhang et al. [37] confirmed the general feasibility of
flush and eviction based cache attacks from unprivileged
code on ARM processors. Given the lack of flush in-
structions on a large selection of ARM devices and the
deployment of non-inclusive LLCs or inclusive LLCs
implementing AutoLock, the authors might have left an
overly pessimistic conclusion of ARM’s security against
cache attacks. In addition, ARM’s highly flexible licens-
ing ecosystem creates a heterogeneous market of system-
on-chips (SoCs) that can exhibit significant differences
in their microarchitectural implementations. Demme et
al. [11] illustrate that already small changes to the cache
architecture can have considerable impact on the side-
channel vulnerability of the processor. Consequently,
judging the true impact of cache attacks on a broad range
of ARM based platforms remains to be a challenge. This
work adds another step in this process. It is a contribu-
tion to an in-depth understanding of microarchitectural
features on ARM in general and an extension to our cur-
rent knowledge of cache implementations in particular.
1.1 Contribution
This work unveils AutoLock, an internal and undocu-
mented performance enhancement feature found in in-
clusive cache levels on ARM processors. It prevents
cross-core evictions of cache lines from inclusive last-
level caches, if said lines are allocated in any of the
core-private cache levels. Consequently, it has a direct
and fundamentally adverse effect on all eviction based
cache attacks launched from unprivileged code on multi-
core systems. Understanding AutoLock and determin-
ing its existence on a given system-on-chip is vital to as-
sess the SoC’s vulnerability to those attacks. Yet, neither
technical reference manuals (TRMs) nor any other pub-
lic product documentation by ARM mention AutoLock.
We therefore provide a detailed description of the fea-
ture and propose three methodologies to test for it: using
a hardware debugging probe, reading the performance
monitoring unit (PMU), and conducting simple cache-
timing measurements. Each test strategy has different
requirements and reliability; having multiple of them
is vital to test for AutoLock under any circumstances.
With the proposed test suite, we verify AutoLock on
ARM Cortex-A7, A15, A53, and A57 processors. As
AutoLock is likely implemented on a larger number of
ARM processors, we discuss its general implications and
how our results relate to previous literature.
Despite its adverse effect on eviction based cache at-
tacks, the impact of AutoLock can be reduced. We dis-
cuss generic circumvention strategies and execute the
attack by Irazoqui et al. [20] in a practical cross-core
Evict+Reload scenario on a Cortex-A15 implementing
AutoLock. We successfully recover the secret key from
a table based implementation of AES and show that at-
tacks can tolerate AutoLock if multiple cache lines are
exploitable. Furthermore, the presented circumvention
strategies implicitly facilitate cross-core eviction based
attacks also on non-inclusive caches. This is because in
the context of cross-core LLC evictions, inclusive last-
level caches with AutoLock behave identically to non-
inclusive ones. In summary, our main contributions are:
• the disclosure and description of AutoLock, an un-
documented and previously unknown cache imple-
mentation feature with adverse impact on practical
eviction based cache attacks on ARM devices,
• a comprehensive test suite to determine the exis-
tence of AutoLock on actual devices, as its presence
is not documented publicly,
• a discussion of AutoLock’s implications and its re-
lation to previous literature demonstrating cache at-
tacks on ARM, and
• a set of strategies to circumvent AutoLock to-
gether with a practical demonstration of a cross-
core Evict+Reload attack on a multi-core SoC im-
plementing AutoLock.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes AutoLock. A theoretical methodology
to test for it is presented in Section 3. We evaluate SoCs
for AutoLock in Section 4 and address how recent lit-
erature relates to it in Section 5. The implications of
AutoLock are discussed in Section 6. Circumvention
strategies together with a practical cross-core attack are
presented in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2
2 AutoLock: Transparent Lockdown of
Cache Lines in Inclusive Cache Levels
Processor caches can be organized in levels that build up
a hierarchy. Higher levels have small capacities and fast
response times. L1 typically refers to the highest level.
In contrast, lower levels have increased capacities and
response times. The lowest cache level is often referred
to as the last-level cache, or LLC. Data and instructions
brought into cache reside on cache lines, the smallest
logical storage unit. In set-associative caches, lines are
grouped into sets of fixed size. The number of lines or
ways per cache set is called the associativity of the cache
level. It can be different for every level. Whether a cache
level can hold copies of cache lines stored in other lev-
els is mainly defined by the inclusiveness property. If a
cache level x is inclusive with respect to a higher level
y, then all valid cache lines contained in y must also be
contained in x. If x is exclusive with respect to y, valid
lines in y must not be contained in x. If any combination
is possible, the cache is said to be non-inclusive.
Inclusive caches enforce two rules. If a cache line is
brought into a higher cache level, a copy of the line must
be stored in the inclusive lower level. On multi-core pro-
cessors, this offers a substantial performance advantage
to coherency protocols, because determining whether a
line is stored anywhere in the hierarchy is achieved by
simply looking into the LLC. Vice versa, if a line is
evicted from the lower level, any copy in the higher lev-
els must subsequently be evicted as well. This is an im-
plicit consequence of the inclusiveness property that has
been successfully exploited in cross-core cache attacks
that target inclusive LLCs [17, 18, 26].
Evictions in higher cache levels to maintain inclusive-
ness can add substantial performance penalties in prac-
tice. In a patent publication by Williamson and ARM
Ltd., the authors propose a mechanism that protects a
given line in an inclusive cache level from eviction, if any
higher cache level holds a copy of the line [33]. An indi-
cator storage element that is integrated into the inclusive
cache level tracks which lines are stored in higher lev-
els. The element can be realized with a set of indicator
or inclusion bits per cache line, or a tag directory. If an
indicator is set, the corresponding line is protected. This
mechanism therefore prevents said performance penal-
ties, because subsequent evictions in higher cache levels
are prohibited. We refer to this transparent protection
of cache lines in the LLC as Automatic Lockdown or
AutoLock.
The impact of AutoLock during eviction is illustrated
in Figure 1. For simplicity, the illustration is based on a
two-level cache hierarchy: core-private L1 caches and a
shared inclusive last-level cache (L2) with one inclusion
bit per cache line. S and L are placeholders for any avail-
Figure 1: Simplified example of evicting a cache line
from level 1 (left) and level 2 (right) cache sets. The
level 2 cache is inclusive with respect to level 1 and im-
plements AutoLock.
able cache set and line in the two cache levels. The left
side of the figure shows how a cache line is evicted in L1.
First, an allocation request for set S is received. Then, a
target line L is selected by the replacement algorithm for
eviction. If a copy of L is present in any other of the core-
private L1 caches, it can immediately be evicted without
updating the inclusion bit in L2. Because other L1 copies
exist, the bit does not need to be changed. If no other L1
cache holds a copy of L, the inclusion bit must be reset
in L2, which unlocks the copy of L in L2. After the bit is
reset, L is evicted from L1.
Similarly, an allocation request in L2 triggers the re-
placement algorithm to select a line in set S for eviction.
Before L is evicted in L2, its inclusion bit is checked. If
a copy of L exists in any L1 cache, the replacement al-
gorithm is called again to select another target line. This
is repeated until one line is found whose inclusion bit is
not set. This line is then evicted to allow the allocation
of a new one.
If the number of ways in the inclusive lower cache
level, Wl , is higher than the sum of ways in all higher
cache levels, i.e., Wh,sum = ∑Ni=1 Wh,i, it can be guaran-
teed that at least one line is always selectable for evic-
tion. If Wl =Wh,sum, all lines of a set in the lower cache
level can be auto-locked. In this case, the patent pro-
poses to fall back to the previous behavior, i.e., evict all
copies of a line from higher level caches. This unlocks
the line in the lower cache level and subsequently en-
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ables its eviction. If the number of ways in the lower
cache level is further reduced, such that Wl <Wh,sum, ad-
ditional measures must be taken to implement inclusive-
ness and Automatic Lockdown. While not impossible
per se, this case is not covered by the patent authors.
If an inclusive LLC with AutoLock is targeted in a
cache attack, the adversary is not able to evict a target’s
data or instructions from the LLC, as long as they are
contained in the target’s core-private cache. In theory,
the adversary can only succeed, if the scenario is reduced
to a same-core attack. Then, it is possible once again
to directly evict data and instructions from core-private
caches. Note that the same attack limitation is encoun-
tered on systems with non-inclusive last-level caches, be-
cause cache lines are allowed to reside in higher lev-
els without being stored in lower levels. In both cases,
AutoLock and non-inclusive LLC, the attacks do not
work cross-core because the attacking core cannot in-
fluence the target core’s private cache. Note that it is
possible, and indeed common on ARM processors, that
there are separate L1 caches for instructions and data and
that the LLC is inclusive with respect to one of them, but
non-inclusive with respect to the other. In Section 7, we
discuss possible strategies to circumvent AutoLock and
re-enable cross-core cache attacks. Because of said simi-
larities, those strategies also enable cross-core attacks on
non-inclusive LLCs.
Distinct from Automatic Lockdown, there exists
programmable lockdown in some ARM processors. Re-
gardless of inclusiveness, it allows the user to explic-
itly lock and unlock cache lines by writing to regis-
ters of the cache controller. This has the same effect
as AutoLock, i.e., the locked cache line will not be
evicted until it is unlocked. In contrast, however, pro-
grammable lockdown must be actively requested by a
typically privileged user. Of the four Cortex-A proces-
sors we study in this paper, the technical reference man-
uals do not mention programmable lockdown for any of
them [2, 3, 4, 5]. Automatic Lockdown, however, is
found in all of them.
3 How to Test for AutoLock
AutoLock is neither mentioned in ARM’s architecture
reference manuals [6, 7] nor in the technical refer-
ence manuals of the Cortex-A cores considered in this
work [2, 3, 4, 5]. To the best of our knowledge, it is
not publicly documented other than in patent form [33].
Based on official information, it is therefore impossi-
ble to determine which Cortex-A or thereto compliant
processor cores implement AutoLock, let alone whether
an actual system-on-chip features it. The presence of
AutoLock, however, is crucial to assess the risk of cache
attacks, in particular those that rely on cross-core evic-
tions in the LLC. We therefore propose the following test
methodology to determine the existence of AutoLock.
On any device under test, two processes are spawned on
distinct cores of the processor implementing an inclusive
last-level cache. The first process allocates a cache line
in the private cache level of the core it is running on. This
allocation is done with a simple memory access. The in-
clusiveness property ensures that a copy of the cache line
must also be allocated in the last-level cache. The second
process then tries to evict the line from LLC by filling the
cache set the line is contained in with dummy data. If the
cache line remains in the LLC after the cross-core evic-
tion, the test concludes that AutoLock is implemented.
This test strategy requires that the eviction itself works
reliably. Otherwise, false positives are encountered. The
following section describes the eviction and how to en-
sure its proper function.
3.1 Cache Eviction
In order to evict a cache line from LLC, we implement
the method described by Gruss et al. [13] and Lipp et
al. [25]. Assume that an address T is stored on line L
in cache set S. In order to evict L from S, one has to
access a number of addresses distinct from T that all map
to S. These memory accesses fill up S and eventually
remove L from the set. The addresses that are accessed
in this process are said to be set-congruent to T . They are
collected in the eviction set C. Whenever C is accessed,
T is forced out of the set S. The sequence of accesses to
addresses in C is referred to as the eviction strategy.
The eviction method proposed by Gruss et al. [13] is
shown in Algorithm 1. The idea is to always access a
subset of the addresses in C for a number of repetitions,
then replace one address in the subset with a new one,
and repeat. This essentially yields a window that slides
over all available set-congruent addresses. We therefore
refer to this method as sliding window eviction. In the
algorithm, N denotes the total number of generated win-
dows, A defines the repetitions per window, and D de-
Algorithm 1: Sliding window eviction of the form
N-A-D [13, 25].
Input:
C ... list of set-congruent addresses
1 for i = 0..N-1 do /* # of windows */
2 for j = 0..A-1 do /* # reps/window */
3 for k = 0..D-1 do /* # addrs/window */
4 access(C[i+ k]);
5 end
6 end
7 end
4
Table 1: Number of inclusive L1 and L2 ways, and evic-
tion strategy (N-A-D) for the ARM and ARM-compliant
processors of the test devices.
Processor L1 Ways L2 Ways N-A-D
Cortex-A7 2 (Instr.) 8 23-4-2
Cortex-A15 2 (Data) 16 36-6-2
Cortex-A53 2 (Instr.) 16 25-2-6
Cortex-A57 2 (Data) 16 30-4-6
Krait 4501 4 (Data) 8 50-1-1
notes the number of addresses per window. The required
size of C is given by the sum of N and D. The final evic-
tion strategy is then written as the triple N-A-D. The strat-
egy 23-4-2, for example, comprises 23 total windows,
each iterated 4 consecutive times and containing 2 ad-
dresses. Lipp et al. [25] demonstrate that sliding window
eviction can successfully be applied to ARM processors.
The parameters N-A-D must be determined once for
each processor. This is done by creating a list of set-
congruent addresses C and exhaustively iterating over
multiple choices of N, A, and D. By continuously check-
ing the success of the eviction, the strategy with the
least number of memory accesses that still provides re-
liable eviction can be determined. Generating the list
of set-congruent addresses C requires access to physi-
cal address information. This is because the last-level
caches on our test devices use bits of the physical address
as the index to the cache sets. If the parameter search
for N, A, and D is done in a bare-metal setting, physi-
cal address information is directly available. Operating
systems typically employ virtual addresses that must be
translated to physical ones. Applications on Linux, for
instance, can consult the file /proc/[pid]/pagemap to
translate virtual addresses [25]. Although accessing the
pagemap is efficient, access to it can be limited to priv-
ileged code or deactivated permanently. Alternatively,
huge pages reveal sufficient bits of the physical address
to derive the corresponding cache set [18]. To find ad-
dresses set-congruent to T , new memory is allocated and
the containing addresses are compared to T . If the least
significant address bits match while the most significant
bits differ, the address will map to T ’s cache set but will
be placed on a different line within the set. If access to
physical address information is entirely prohibited, tim-
ing measurements can still be used to find set-congruent
addresses [28].
Once C is filled with addresses, they are accessed
according to Algorithm 1. If a processor core imple-
ments separated data and instruction caches, the manner
in which a set-congruent address ought to be accessed
differs. Data addresses can be accessed by loading their
content to a register with the LDR assembly instruction.
Instruction addresses can be accessed by executing a
branch instruction that jumps to it. When determining
N-A-D on devices that might implement AutoLock, all
memory accesses to T and all evictions of it must be per-
formed on a single core. This ensures that AutoLock is
not interfering with the parameter search. Once the evic-
tion with a triple N-A-D works reliably in the same-core
setting, the AutoLock tests can be commenced.
3.2 AutoLock Tests
AutoLock is an internal feature of cache architectures on
ARM. Its presence on a processor has to be determined
only once, as currently nothing indicates that it can be en-
or disabled from software. In the subsequent sections we
propose three tests that have been designed to prove or
disprove the existence of AutoLock. All of them follow
the general methodology of determining the success of a
cross-core eviction strategy that is known to succeed in
the same-core scenario. For simplicity, all tests are ex-
plained in a dual-core setting. For a system with more
processor cores, each test can either be repeated multi-
ple times or extended in order to determine the presence
of AutoLock simultaneously on all but one core. In the
dual-core setting, core 0 is accessing the target address
T and core 1 is trying to evict it by using the eviction set
C and the processor specific eviction parameters N-A-D.
Table 1 contains the parameters for the processors con-
sidered in this work. For all tests, both T and C are listed
as inputs required for eviction, while the triple N-A-D is
assumed to be correctly set according to Table 1.
3.2.1 Hardware Debugger
The first method to test for AutoLock is through the us-
age of a hardware debugger. It allows to halt a processor
at will and directly monitor the cache content. A break-
point is inserted after the eviction of T and the contents
of the caches are analyzed. Through this visual inspec-
tion, it is possible to determine with very high confidence
whether or not T remains in the cache after the eviction
strategy is run. Given an inclusive LLC, it is sufficient to
confirm that T either remains in L1 or in L2 to prove that
AutoLock is present. Algorithm 2 outlines this test.
Algorithm 2: Hardware Debugger Test
Input:
T ... target address
C ... corresponding eviction set
1 Core 0 brings T to L1 and L2.
2 Core 1 runs eviction strategy using C.
3 Halt processor and inspect caches.
4 if T in L1 of Core 0 or L2 then AutoLock is present
5 else AutoLock is not present
5
The hardware debugger test requires a debugging unit,
a target platform that supports it, and physical access
to the target device. We use the DSTREAM debugging
unit [8] in combination with the ARM DS-5 development
studio to conduct it. Although DSTREAM only supports
a limited number of SoCs2, the test described in this sec-
tion can also be run with other debugging hardware.
3.2.2 Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU)
The second test utilizes the performance monitoring
unit, which can count the occurrence of microarchitec-
tural events in a processor. The PMU of ARMv7- and
ARMv8-compliant processors can be configured to count
the number of accesses (hit or miss) to the last-level
cache. The corresponding event is defined under the ID
0x16 in the architectural reference manuals [6, 7]. The
difference of the access counts before and after reloading
the target address T indicates whether the reload fetched
the address from the L1 or the L2 cache. A fetch from
L1 indicates that the eviction strategy failed and suggests
that AutoLock is implemented. If the eviction strategy is
successful, the target address has to be fetched from ex-
ternal memory. Before querying the slow external mem-
ory, the L2 cache is accessed and checked for the tar-
get address. This access is counted and indicates that
AutoLock is not implemented. To determine this extra
access to the L2, a reference value R must be obtained
before the test. This is done by reading the L2 access
counter for a reload with no previous run of the evic-
tion strategy, which guarantees a fetch from core-private
cache. The PMU test can the be conducted as outlined in
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: PMU Test
Input:
T ... target address
C ... corresponding eviction set
R ... L2 access reference count
1 Core 0 brings T to L1 and L2.
2 Core 1 runs eviction strategy using C.
3 Save PMU count of L2 accesses.
4 Core 0 reloads T .
5 Save PMU count again and calculate difference d.
6 if d ≈ R then AutoLock is present
7 else AutoLock is not present
This test requires access to the PMU, which on ARM
is typically limited to privileged code, unless otherwise
configured. Some operating systems, however, allow
userspace applications to access hardware performance
events. On Linux, for instance, the perf subsystem of
the kernel provides this access via the perf event open
system call. In general, the PMU test can be used when
the target processor is not supported by a hardware de-
bugger, or if physical access to the device is not given.
Since PMU event counts can be affected by system ac-
tivity unrelated to the AutoLock test, it is recommended
to repeat the experiment multiple times. The best results
can be obtained in a bare-metal setting, where the test
code is executed without a full-scale operating system.
3.2.3 Cache-timing Measurements
The third experiment uses timing measurements to infer
from where in the memory hierarchy the target address
T is reloaded after the supposed eviction. If external
memory access times are known, the reload time of T
can indicate whether AutoLock is implemented or not.
If after the eviction strategy the reload time is smaller
than what is expected for an external memory access, the
target address is likely fetched from cache, thus indicat-
ing AutoLock. If the reload time is equal to an external
memory access, the eviction strategy was successful and
AutoLock is likely not present. This test approach is out-
lined in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Cache-timing Test
Input:
T ... target address
C ... corresponding eviction set
M ... external memory access time
1 Core 0 brings T to L1 and L2.
2 Core 1 runs eviction strategy using C.
3 Core 0 reloads T and measures reload time t.
4 if t < M then AutoLock is present
5 else AutoLock is not present
This test has no further requirements other than run-
ning code on the system from userspace and having ac-
cess to a sufficiently accurate timing source. Commonly
used timing sources include hardware based time-stamp
counters (PMCCNTR for ARM), the perf subsystem of
Linux, the POSIX clock gettime() function, and a
custom thread based timer. If available, a hardware based
time-stamp counter is preferred due to its high precision.
Further discussions about timing sources can be found
in the work by Lipp et al. [25] and Zhang et al. [37].
Similar to PMU event counts, timing measurements can
significantly be affected by noise. It is therefore advis-
able to repeat the proposed test multiple times to get a ro-
bust conclusion about whether address T is fetched from
cache or external memory.
4 Finding AutoLock in Existing SoCs
In this work, we evaluate the presence of AutoLock on
four test devices and their corresponding system-on-
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chips. They are illustrated in Table 2. The Samsung
Exynos 5422 and the ARM Juno r0 SoCs feature two
processors with multiple cores each. They are so-called
ARM big.LITTLE platforms, on which a powerful pro-
cessor is paired with an energy efficient one. Together
with the Samsung Exynos 5250, these SoCs are part of
dedicated development boards or single-board comput-
ers. In contrast, the Qualcomm Snapdragon 805 is part
of an off-the-shelf mobile phone. In total, the four test
devices comprise five different processors: the ARM
Cortex-A7, A15, A53, A57, and the Qualcomm Krait
450. Table 1 provides more details about them. It shows
the number of ways in L1 and L2 caches, and the evic-
tion strategy parameters for all of them. The illustrated
processors implement separate L1 instruction and data
caches. The number of L1 ways is given only for the
side which the L2 cache is inclusive to. The LLCs on the
Cortex-A7 and A53 are inclusive to the L1 instruction
caches, while the LLCs on the Cortex-A15, A57, and the
Krait 450 are inclusive to the L1 data caches. Although
the documentation does not explicitly state that the L2
cache on the Cortex-A53 is instruction-inclusive [3], our
practical experiments strongly suggest that it is. In ad-
dition, the lead architect of the A53 confirmed it in an
interview [32].
The tests on the Cortex-A processors are initially done
in a bare-metal setting. The lack of an operating sys-
tem eliminates interfering cache usage from system pro-
cesses, thereby significantly reducing noise. The ex-
periments are then repeated on Linux for verification.
The experiments on the Krait 450 are conducted on
Linux only. For each processor, we verify that the
eviction parameters listed in Table 1 can successfully
evict cache lines in a same-core setting. More precisely,
we verify successful eviction when evicting data cache
lines using data addresses, and when evicting instruction
cache lines using instruction addresses. We then test for
AutoLock in the cross-core case with the experiments
proposed in the previous section.
4.1 Test Results
The subsequent sections present the results for all test
methodologies described in Section 3. Along with the
conclusions about the presence of AutoLock on the test
devices, details about the practical execution of the ex-
periments are discussed.
4.1.1 Hardware Debugger
The SoCs on the ARM Juno and the Arndale develop-
ment boards are the only ones among the test devices
that are supported by DSTREAM. It is therefore possi-
ble to visually inspect the L1 caches of the Cortex-A15,
Table 2: Platforms used for the evaluation of AutoLock.
Device System-on-Chip Processor
Arndale Samsung Exynos 5250 2x Cortex-A15
ODROID-XU4 Samsung Exynos 5422 4x Cortex-A74x Cortex-A15
ARM Juno ARM Juno r0 4x Cortex-A532x Cortex-A57
Nexus 6 Qualcomm Snapdragon 805 4x Krait 450
A53, and A57 processors, and the L2 caches of the A15
and A57. A hardware limitation of the Cortex-A53 on
the ARM Juno board prevents the visual inspection of
its L2 cache. To still test for AutoLock on the A53, we
leverage the inclusiveness property to surmise L2 con-
tents. According to Algorithm 2, AutoLock can still be
concluded, if the target address is contained in the core-
private cache of core 0. This is derived from the inclu-
siveness property of the L2 cache.
To conduct the tests, we connect each supported board,
in turn, to the DSTREAM and use breakpoints to tem-
porarily halt program execution after the eviction algo-
rithm is run. When halted, we use the Cache View of
the DS-5 development studio to visually determine if the
target cache line is present in the respective caches. For
the A53, we infer the contents of the L2 based on the in-
clusive L1. We ran the experiments several times on the
A15, A53, and A57 processors. All trials indicate each
processor’s inclusive cache implements AutoLock.
4.1.2 Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU)
To verify to results of the Cortex-A53, we conduct the
experiment described in Algorithm 3 with it. The PMU
is configured to count accesses to the L2 cache. We then
execute a target instruction on core 0 and run a 25-2-6
eviction strategy on core 1. Before and after reloading
the target instruction, we insert 10 NOP instructions. This
reduces the effects of pipelining, as the A53 has an 8-
stage pipeline. To ensure we only measure exactly the
reload of the target instruction, we execute a DSB and ISB
instruction before each set of NOPs. These instructions
function as memory barriers, guaranteeing that memory
access instructions will execute sequentially. This is nec-
essary because the ARM architecture allows memory ac-
cesses to be reordered to optimize performance.
As a result, we observe that reloading the target in-
struction after executing the eviction algorithm causes
no additional L2 access. This indicates that the eviction
failed and the reload was served from L1. If the evic-
tion had succeeded, the event counter would have been
incremented by the L2 cache miss. We ran the exper-
iment multiple times and observed consistent results in
each trial. This confirms the presence of AutoLock on
the Cortex-A53.
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Figure 2: Memory access times with and without cross-
core eviction on the Krait 450 processor. A threshold of
700 clock cycles clearly separates the two timing distri-
butions, which indicates that AutoLock is not present.
4.1.3 Cache-timing Measurements
To determine the presence of AutoLock on the Cortex-
A7 and the Krait 450, we execute the cache-timing ex-
periment described in Algorithm 4. In addition, timing
measurements are used to verify the results obtained for
the Cortex-A15, A53, and A57. In all experiments, the
perf subsystem of the Linux kernel is used to measure
access times with a hardware based clock cycle counter.
This was taken from Lipp et al. [25]3.
Figure 2 shows the timing data collected with two sep-
arate executions of Algorithm 4 on the Krait 450. The
first execution performed the eviction step as defined in
the algorithm. The timings measured during the reload
phase are shown in red. The second execution skipped
the eviction step. These timings are shown in blue, for
comparison. When the eviction step is skipped, the tar-
get address remains in the cache, and thus the access time
is significantly lower, as pictured. This indicates that the
Krait 450 does not implement AutoLock.
The same timing measurements are performed on the
Cortex-A57. The results are shown in Figure 3. Since
the timings for each execution virtually overlap in the
graph, it is clear that the target address is never evicted.
This confirms the results for the A57 derived with the
hardware debugger, i.e., that it implements AutoLock.
For both the Krait 450 and the A57, we performed 50,000
measurements to ensure that clear trends can be seen.
Corresponding experiments on the Cortex-A7 indicate
that its instruction cache side implements AutoLock.
The measurements on the Cortex-A15 and A53 proces-
sors confirm the previous results and indicate once more
that they implement AutoLock.
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Figure 3: Memory access times with and without cross-
core eviction on the ARM Cortex-A57 processor. The
two timing distributions clearly overlap, which indicates
that AutoLock inhibits the eviction.
4.2 Discussion of the Test Results
The summary of the test results is shown in Table 3. All
ARM Cortex-A processors on our test devices exhibit
AutoLock in their inclusive last-level caches, whereas
no evidence of AutoLock can be found on the Qual-
comm Krait 450. The practical impact of AutoLock is
that cache lines in the LLC are transparently locked dur-
ing runtime. On a multi-core system, this can be trig-
gered simultaneously in multiple cores. For each core,
AutoLock essentially reduces the number of lines per
LLC set that are available to store new data and instruc-
tions. Depending on the associativity of the core-private
cache levels the LLC is inclusive to, a significant fraction
of cache lines can be locked in an LLC set. Referring to
Table 1, it can be seen that the Cortex-A7 features 2-way
L1 instruction caches and an inclusive 8-way L2 cache.
This means that on a quad-core A7 it is possible to lock
all ways of an LLC cache set with instructions held in the
core-private caches. Requests to store lines from L1 data
caches in such a set subsequently fail, but do not vio-
late inclusiveness, as the LLC is non-inclusive to L1 data
caches. On the other Cortex-A processors, L2 cache sets
cannot fully be locked. In quad-core Cortex-A15, A53,
Table 3: Evaluation results for the ARM and ARM-
compliant processors of the test devices.
Processor System-on-Chip AutoLock
Cortex-A7 Samsung Exynos 5422 Present
Cortex-A15 Samsung Exynos 5250/5422 Present
Cortex-A53 ARM Juno r0 Present
Cortex-A57 ARM Juno r0 Present
Krait 450 Qualcomm Snapdragon 805 Not Present
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and A57 processors, up to 8 ways can be locked down
in an L2 cache set at once. As the Krait 450 does not
implement AutoLock, the number of ways in the LLC
does not need to match the sum of ways in the L1 caches.
Hence, the L1 data caches contain 4 ways while the LLC
contains 8 ways.
5 Related Work
Early practical cache attacks were demonstrated by
Bernstein [10] and Osvik et al. [29]. While Bernstein
based his analysis on the overall execution time of AES
encryptions, Osvik et al. implemented two access-driven
techniques named Evict+Time and Prime+Probe.
These techniques were used to introduce novel attack
methodologies and cipher targets. Acıic¸mez [1] and Per-
cival [30] utilized Prime+Probe to steal an RSA se-
cret key while Neve and Seifert utilized it to perform
an efficient last round attack on AES [27]. Ristenpart
et al. [31] used the same technique to recover keystrokes
from co-resident virtual machines (VMs) in the Amazon
EC2 cloud. This work was later expanded by Zhang et
al. [38], proving the effectiveness of Prime+Probe to
recover El Gamal cryptographic keys across VMs via
the L2 cache. Concurrently, a new attack methodology
was proposed by Gullasch et al. [16], who were able
to retrieve an AES key from a core co-resident victim
by abusing memory deduplication, the flush instruction
clflush, and the Completely Fair Scheduler of Linux.
Yarom and Falkner [34] extended the work by Gul-
lasch et al. and proposed the Flush+Reload attack,
with which they recovered RSA secret keys across pro-
cessor cores and virtual machines. This work was ex-
panded by Irazoqui et al. [20, 21], who demonstrated
the recovery of AES keys and TLS session messages.
The Flush+Reload technique was concurrently used by
Benger et al. [9] to recover ECC secret keys, by Zhang
et al. [39] to attack e-commerce applications across PaaS
VMs, and by Gruss et al. [15] to implement template at-
tacks. Based on the timing variations of clflush, Gruss
et al. [14] proposed the Flush+Flush attack. As a sub-
stitute to the flush instruction, Gruss et al. [15] also pro-
posed the Evict+Reload attack.
Flush+Reload, Flush+Flush, and Evict+Reload
require shared memory between an adversary and a tar-
get. This requirement was removed by Liu et al. [26]
and Irazoqui et al. [18], who showed the feasibility
of Prime+Probe via the last-level cache. Both stud-
ies opened a range of scenarios in which cache attacks
could be applied. For instance, Oren et al. [28] executed
Prime+Probe in JavaScript and Inci et al. [17] demon-
strated the applicability of the technique in commercial
IaaS clouds.
Different aspects of the cache hierarchy have also
been exploited to recover sensitive information. Irazo-
qui et al. [19] demonstrated the applicability of cache
attacks across CPUs through the cache coherency pro-
tocol. Yarom et al. [35] showed that cache bank con-
tentions introduce timing variations of accesses to dif-
ferent words on a single cache line. Gruss et al. [12]
exploited prefetching instructions to circumvent super-
visor mode access prevention and address space layout
randomization.
Most of the previous cache attack literature is dedi-
cated to the x86 architecture. Recent works [25, 36, 37]
have made several contributions to overcome the chal-
lenges of applying known userspace cache attacks from
x86 to ARM processors. AutoLock is not recognized or
mentioned in any of them. The following section dis-
cusses how AutoLock relates to these publications and
why it might have stayed undetected.
5.1 AutoLock in Previous Work
Lipp et al. [25] were the first to demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of Prime+Probe, Flush+Reload, Evict+Reload,
and Flush+Flush attacks on ARM devices. Despite
their extensive experiments, the authors did not mention
any encounter of a feature similar to AutoLock. We be-
lieve this can mainly be explained with their selection of
test devices: the OnePlus One, the Alcatel One Touch
Pop 2, and the Samsung Galaxy S6. Respectively, these
mobile phones feature the Krait 400, the Cortex-A53,
and a big.LITTLE configuration of the Cortex-A53 and
Cortex-A57. We assume that the Krait 400, like the Krait
450 we experimented on, does not feature AutoLock.
For the Cortex-A53, we believe the authors relied on
evictions caused by background activity on the target
core to successfully execute cross-core attacks. They
evict instructions from the instruction-inclusive L2 cache
using data accesses from a different core, which we have
found to be impossible on the Cortex-A53. Indeed, in
discussing their cross-core eviction strategy on this pro-
cessor, they mention “the probability that an address is
evicted from L1 due system activity is very high” [24],
though it is not clear if they are referring to the attack-
ing core, the victim core, or both. The third and fi-
nal test device, the Samsung Galaxy S6, features a full-
hierarchy flush instruction available from userspace by
default. Thus, the authors bypassed AutoLock by flush-
ing cache lines instead of evicting them.
Zhang et al. [37] implemented a variant of the
Flush+Reload attack in a zero-permission Android ap-
plication. The authors also experimented on processors
featuring AutoLock and did not mention any encounter
with it either. In fact, they used the same processors an-
alyzed in this work, namely, the Cortex-A7, A15, A53,
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A57, and the Krait 450. Since their work was focused
solely on Flush+Reload, one of the two cache attacks
unaffected by AutoLock, we assume they simply did
not encounter it during their experiments. One of the
main contributions of their work was to implement an
instruction-side Reload in a return-oriented manner, i.e.,
by executing small blocks of instructions. This con-
tribution stemmed from using the cacheflush syscall
in the Flush step, as it only invalidates the instruction
side. As a prerequisite for their final target device se-
lection, the authors experimentally determined the inclu-
siveness property of the last-level caches on all devices.
Surprisingly, they concluded that all of the L2 caches in
the aforementioned processors are inclusive with respect
to the L1 data and instruction caches. This contradicts
our experiments, which found the Cortex-A7 and A53 to
only be inclusive on the instruction side, and the Cortex-
A15 and A57 to only be inclusive on the data side. Fur-
ther, the official ARM documentation of the Cortex-A7,
for example, explains that “Data is only allocated to the
L2 cache when evicted from the L1 memory system, not
when first fetched from the system.” [5]. We understand
this to mean that the L2 cache of the Cortex-A7 is not in-
clusive with respect to the L1 data caches. This complies
with our observations.
In other previous work, Zhang et al. [36] implemented
a Prime+Probe attack in an unprivileged Android ap-
plication on an ARM Cortex-A8. In this work, we did
not determine the presence of AutoLock on this pro-
cessor model. However, the test system used by Zhang
et al. [36] comprised only a single Cortex-A8 processor
core. As AutoLock does not affect same-core attacks,
the experiments of the authors would not have been af-
fected, even if the Cortex-A8 implemented AutoLock.
6 Implications of AutoLock
Automatic Lockdown prevents the eviction of cache
lines from inclusive cache levels, if copies of that line
are contained in any of the caches said level is inclu-
sive to. Yet, the ability to evict data and instructions
from a target’s cache is a key requirement for practi-
cal cross-core cache attacks. Table 4 illustrates the im-
pact of AutoLock on state of the art cache attacks im-
plemented on ARM Cortex-A processors. Each row
shows one attack technique and the corresponding ef-
fect of AutoLock in three different scenarios: same-core,
cross-core, and cross-CPU. A ‘3’ or ‘*’ signifies that
an attack can be mounted, whereas a ‘7’ indicates that
AutoLock fundamentally interferes with the attack.
Given the nature of Automatic Lockdown, all same-
core attacks remain possible, as the adversary can evict
target memory from all core-private cache levels. All
attacks based on a full-hierarchy flush instruction are
Table 4: Utility of known cache attacks in different
scenarios on ARM Cortex-A processors with inclusive
caches implementing AutoLock. ‘3’ indicates the attack
is unaffected by AutoLock, while ‘7’ denotes obstruc-
tion by AutoLock. Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush
are uninhibited by AutoLock but only apply to a limited
number of ARMv8-A SoCs and are thus listed as ‘*’.
Attack Same-core Cross-core Cross-CPU
Evict + Time [29] 3 7 7
Prime + Probe [29] 3 7 7
Flush + Reload [34] * * *
Evict + Reload [15] 3 7 7
Flush + Flush [14] * * *
also not affected by AutoLock. However, said flush in-
struction, unlike on x86 processors, is not available on
any ARMv7-A compliant processor and must be enabled
in control registers on ARMv8-A compliant processors.
Access to these control registers is limited to privileged,
i.e., kernel or hypervisor code. These flush based attacks,
namely Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush, are therefore
denoted with ‘*’.
All attacks based on evicting a cache line by access-
ing set-congruent addresses are affected by Automatic
Lockdown in cross-core scenarios. Evict+Time,
Prime+Probe, and Evict+Reload techniques are all
impaired by AutoLock. To leverage their full potential,
circumvention strategies must be found and employed.
In general, such strategies can also be used to target non-
inclusive LLCs, where cross-core evictions are not pos-
sible, either. In the upcoming section, we discuss cir-
cumvention strategies and demonstrate that the attack
proposed by Irazoqui et al. [20] can still be mounted in
a cross-core Evict+Reload scenario with an inclusive
LLC implementing AutoLock.
7 Circumventing AutoLock
Despite the restrictions that Automatic Lockdown
poses to eviction based cache attacks, its effects can be
alleviated with the following strategies:
• Pre-select Target SoCs: Our findings suggest that
AutoLock is present on Cortex-A cores designed by
ARM itself, while it is not implemented by ARM
compliant cores, such as Qualcomm’s Krait 450. As
the concept is protected by US patent [33], ARMv7-
A and ARMv8-A compliant cores would have to
pay royalties to implement AutoLock. By exclu-
sively targeting Cortex-A compliant processors not
implemented by ARM, chances of not encountering
AutoLock increase. Alternatively, Flush+Reload
or Flush+Flush based attacks can still be mounted
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on ARMv8-A SoCs that offer the cache flush in-
struction in userspace, i.e. the Samsung Galaxy
S6 [25].
• Achieve Same-core Scenario: Certain attack sce-
narios realistically allow the adversary to execute
code on the same core as the target program. Since
same-core attacks are not affected by AutoLock,
this entirely removes its impact. ARM TrustZone,
e.g., enables secure execution of trusted code on
an untrusted operating system. Given that the un-
trusted OS is compromised by the adversary, the
trusted code can be scheduled to run on any given
processor core. By matching the core affinity of the
attacking process to the one of the respective trusted
target, the attack is reduced to a same-core setting
and can successfully be mounted, even across TEE
boundaries [36].
• Trigger Self-evictions: When AutoLock is active,
a cache line can only be evicted from the inclusive
LLC if no higher cache level contains a copy of it.
If the target program offers services to the rest of
the system, the adversary can try to issue requests
such that the core-private cache of the target is suf-
ficiently polluted and the cache line under attack is
evicted. The target program essentially performs
a ‘self-eviction’ and thus re-enables LLC evictions
and consequently cross-core attacks.
• Increase Load and Waiting Time: Inclusive
caches with AutoLock require that the number of
ways in lower levels are greater or equal than the
sum of ways in all higher cache levels. This limits
the associativity of core-private caches, which the
LLC is inclusive to, especially on multi-core sys-
tems. If the attack allows, an adversary can take ad-
vantage of the low associativity and simply prolong
the waiting time between reloads such that the target
line will automatically be evicted from core-private
caches by other system activity scheduled on the re-
spective core. To amplify the effect, the adversary
can also try to increase overall system load, e.g.,
by issuing requests to the OS aiming at increasing
background activity in the targeted core.
• Target Large Data Structures: Self-evictions,
high system load, and prolonged waiting times all
increase the chances that a cache line is evicted by
itself from core-private caches. The success rate
of an attack is further improved, if multiple cache
lines can be targeted. The more lines that are ex-
ploitable, the higher the chances that at least one
of them is automatically evicted from core-private
caches. For example, the transformation tables (T-
tables) of AES software implementations span mul-
tiple cache lines, i.e., 16 lines for a 1 kiB table with
64 bytes per line. The attack proposed by Irazo-
qui et al. [20] observes the first line per table to
recover an entire AES key. The authors note that
“any memory line of the T table would work equally
well.” In the upcoming section, we pick up this idea
and demonstrate how the attack can be extended to
exploit multiple cache lines to successfully circum-
vent AutoLock.
Note that all of the presented strategies increase
the chances of successful attacks not only on inclu-
sive caches implementing AutoLock, but also on non-
inclusive caches.
7.1 Attack on AES
Irazoqui et al. [20] propose an attack on table based im-
plementations of AES using Flush+Reload. The basic
strategy is to flush one cache line per table before an en-
cryption and reload it afterwards. If any lookup table
value stored on the observed cache line is used during en-
cryption, the adversary will encounter fast reload times.
If said line is not accessed, it will be fetched from mem-
ory and reload times will be slow. With all table lookups
dependent on the secret key, the adversary can infer bits
of the key from the observed reload times.
In table based implementations of AES, each cache
line has a certain probability with which it is not used
during en- or decryption. This probability depends on
the size and the number of the tables as well as the size
of the cache lines. It is defined as
Pna =
(
1− t
256
)n
. (1)
Variable t denotes the number of table entries stored on
a cache line. For 4-byte entries and a 64-byte cache line,
t = 16. Variable n defines the number of accesses to the
table that a cache line is part of. Given an AES-128 im-
plementation that uses four 1 kiB T-tables and performs
160 lookups per encryption, which evenly spread over
the four tables, n = 40. With t = 16, this yields a no-
access probability of Pna = 0.0757. Note that the attack
exploits observations of not accessed cache lines. As a
result, the number of required observations increases, as
Pna gets smaller.
The attack targets the last round of AES, i.e., the 10th
round. It is shown in Equation 2. The ciphertext is de-
noted as ci (i = 0..15). The 10th round key is given as
k10i , whereas the state of AES is defined as si. The target
lookup table used in the last round is denoted as T . For
each encryption, the adversary keeps track of the reload
times and the ciphertext. If successful, the attack recov-
ers the last round key. For the recovery phase, the last
round is re-written as
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ci = k10i ⊕T [si] → k10i = ci⊕T [si] . (2)
Improvements The original attack targets one cache
line per table. If the observations of said line are of poor
quality, the attack is prolonged or fails. This can hap-
pen on a processor that implements AutoLock or non-
inclusive caches. If LLC evictions fail, the adversary
cannot determine whether the selected cache line has
been used during encryption. Irazoqui et al. [20] state
that the attack works equally well with all cache lines
carrying lookup table entries. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, it is likely in practice that some of them are
automatically evicted from core-private caches, hence
re-enabling the attack despite AutoLock. To leverage
observations from all available cache lines, we propose
three improvements to the original attack:
1. Majority vote: All available cache lines l are at-
tacked (l = 0..L). This yields L recovered keys. For
each key byte, a majority vote is done over all L re-
covered values. The value with the most frequent
occurrence is assumed to be the correct one. If two
or more values occur equally frequently, the lowest
one is chosen. The majority vote ensures that wrong
hypotheses from noisy cache lines are compensated
for as long as the majority of lines yield correct re-
sults.
2. Probability filter: The reload times allow to calcu-
late the actual no-access probability for each cache
line, P˜lna. For each table, the line closest to the ex-
pected theoretic probability, Pna, is taken and used
in the attack. Lines showing distorted usage statis-
tics due to noise and interference are discarded.
3. Weighted counting: Every cache line is assigned
an individual score Sl that is counted each time a
key byte hypothesis is derived from the line’s reload
times. The score is based on the absolute difference
of the no-access probabilities, dl = abs
(
Pna− P˜lna
)
.
It is defined as Sl = 1− dl1−Pna . After all scores have
been added for all hypotheses, the recovery phase
proceeds as proposed.
We implement the original attack and all improve-
ments using Evict+Reload on a multi-core ARM
Cortex-A15 processor featuring a data-inclusive LLC
with AutoLock. We employ sliding window eviction
with parameters 36-6-2 (see Table 1). The targeted AES
implementation uses four 1 kiB T-tables. The adver-
sary and target processes are running on top of a full-
scale Linux operating system. In total, we perform five
different attacks. First, we implement the original at-
tack with adversary and target on the same core and
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Figure 4: Evict+Reload attacks on an ARM Cortex-
A15 with AutoLock performed with 100 random keys.
The number of key bytes recovered on average are dis-
played for an increasing number of encryptions.
then on separate cores. This illustrates the impact of
AutoLock, which only affects cross-core attacks. The
rest of the attacks are conducted with adversary and tar-
get on separate cores and each demonstrate one of the
proposed improvements. The results are illustrated in
Figure 4. Each attack is repeated for 100 random keys
and the average number of correctly recovered key bytes
is shown over an increasing number of encryptions. It
can clearly be seen that AutoLock impairs the origi-
nal cross-core attack (orig cross). After 400,000 en-
cryptions no more than 5 key bytes are correctly recov-
ered. The fact that at least some key bytes are correct
is owed to sporadic and automatic evictions of the ob-
served cache lines from the target’s core-private cache.
These evictions can be caused by stack and heap data ac-
cesses (such as AES state and key arrays as well as their
pointers), and possibly by unrelated processes sched-
uled on the same core. Attacks in the same-core set-
ting (orig same) are not affected by AutoLock and al-
low full-key recovery. Our improvements clearly demon-
strate that cross-core attacks are still possible, if multiple
cache lines can be observed. Both majority vote (major-
ity) and weighted counting (weighted) recover the entire
key with less than 100,000 encryptions and therefore of-
fer similar success rates as the same-core attack. The
probability filter (prob filter) still allows full-key recov-
ery within 100,000 encryptions, if a brute-force search
with complexity < 232 is added.
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The results illustrate that even on processors imple-
menting AutoLock cache attacks can still be successful
in practice, if multiple cache lines are monitored. Note
that the proposed improvements are also beneficial on
processors without AutoLock or on systems with non-
inclusive caches. If attacks rely on observing a specific
cache line, the chances of success are significantly re-
duced on processors implementing AutoLock.
8 Conclusion
The licensing ecosystem of ARM drives an increasingly
heterogeneous market of processors with significant mi-
croarchitectural differences. Paired with a limited under-
standing of how ARM’s cache architectures function in-
ternally, this makes assessing the practical threat of flush
and eviction based cache attacks on ARM a challenging
task. Although the feasibility of state of the art attacks
has been demonstrated, their requirements are far from
being fulfilled on all ARM processors. Flush instruc-
tions are supported only by the latest architecture ver-
sion and must explicitly be enabled for userspace appli-
cations. This limits the practical utility of flush based at-
tacks. Last-level caches can be non-inclusive, impeding
practical cross-core eviction attacks that require LLCs
to be inclusive. Our work shows that these attacks can
still fail even on inclusive LLCs, if AutoLock is im-
plemented. On the contrary, more sophisticated attack
techniques seem to overcome both AutoLock and non-
inclusive cache hierarchies. We therefore believe that a
fair and comprehensive assessment of ARM’s security
against cache attacks requires a better understanding of
the implemented cache architectures as well as rigorous
testing across a broad range of ARM and thereto compli-
ant processors.
References
[1] ACIIC¸MEZ, O. Yet another microarchitectural attack: Exploiting
i-cache. In Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Workshop on Computer
Security Architecture (2007), CSAW ’07, ACM, pp. 11–18.
[2] ARM LIMITED. Cortex-a15 mpcore revision: r4p0 technical
reference manual. http://infocenter.arm.com/help/
topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0438i/DDI0438I_cortex_a15_
r4p0_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2017-03-22.
[3] ARM LIMITED. Cortex-a53 mpcore processor revision: r0p4
technical reference manual. http://infocenter.arm.com/
help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0500g/DDI0500G_cortex_
a53_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2017-03-22.
[4] ARM LIMITED. Cortex-a57 mpcore processor revision: r1p3
technical reference manual. http://infocenter.arm.com/
help/topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0488h/DDI0488H_cortex_
a57_mpcore_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2017-03-22.
[5] ARM LIMITED. Cortex-a7 mpcore revision: r0p5 technical
reference manual. http://infocenter.arm.com/help/
topic/com.arm.doc.ddi0464f/DDI0464F_cortex_a7_
mpcore_r0p5_trm.pdf. Accessed: 2017-03-22.
[6] ARM LIMITED. ARM Architecture Reference Manual -
ARMv7-A and ARMv7-R Edition, May 2014. Revision C.c.
[7] ARM LIMITED. ARM Architecture Reference Manual -
ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile, December 2014. Re-
vision A.e.
[8] ARM LIMITED. DSTREAM. https://developer.arm.
com/products/software-development-tools/debug-
probes-and-adapters/dstream, 2017. Accessed: 2017-03-
22.
[9] BENGER, N., VAN DE POL, J., SMART, N., AND YAROM, Y.
ooh aah... just a little bit : A small amount of side channel can
go a long way. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Sys-
tems CHES 2014, L. Batina and M. Robshaw, Eds., vol. 8731 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2014, pp. 75–92.
[10] BERNSTEIN, D. J. Cache-timing attacks on AES. Tech. rep.,
The University of Illinois at Chicago, 2005. http://cr.yp.
to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf.
[11] DEMME, J., MARTIN, R., WAKSMAN, A., AND SETHUMAD-
HAVAN, S. Side-channel vulnerability factor: A metric for mea-
suring information leakage. In Proceedings of the 39th Annual In-
ternational Symposium on Computer Architecture (Washington,
DC, USA, 2012), ISCA ’12, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 106–
117.
[12] GRUSS, D., MAURICE, C., FOGH, A., LIPP, M., AND MAN-
GARD, S. Prefetch side-channel attacks: Bypassing smap and
kernel aslr. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security (2016), CCS
’16, pp. 368–379.
[13] GRUSS, D., MAURICE, C., AND MANGARD, S. Rowhammer.js:
A remote software-induced fault attack in javascript. In 13th Con-
ference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability
Assessment (DIMVA) (2016).
[14] GRUSS, D., MAURICE, C., WAGNER, K., AND MANGARD, S.
Flush+flush: A fast and stealthy cache attack. In 13th Conference
on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assess-
ment (DIMVA) (2016).
[15] GRUSS, D., SPREITZER, R., AND MANGARD, S. Cache tem-
plate attacks: Automating attacks on inclusive last-level caches.
In 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15)
(Washington, D.C., Aug. 2015), USENIX Association.
[16] GULLASCH, D., BANGERTER, E., AND KRENN, S. Cache
games – bringing access-based cache attacks on AES to practice.
In Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on (2011),
pp. 490–505.
[17] I˙NCI, M. S., GU¨LMEZOGˇLU, B., IRAZOQUI, G., EISENBARTH,
T., AND SUNAR, B. Cache attacks enable bulk key recovery on
the cloud. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
– CHES 2016: 18th International Conference, Santa Barbara,
CA, USA, August 17-19, 2016, Proceedings (Berlin, Heidelberg,
2016), Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 368–388.
[18] IRAZOQUI, G., EISENBARTH, T., AND SUNAR, B. S$a: A
shared cache attack that works across cores and defies vm sand-
boxingand its application to aes. In Security and Privacy (SP),
2013 IEEE Symposium on (2015).
[19] IRAZOQUI, G., EISENBARTH, T., AND SUNAR, B. Cross pro-
cessor cache attacks. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Symposium
on Information, Computer and Communications Security (2016),
ASIA CCS ’16, ACM.
[20] IRAZOQUI, G., INCI, M., EISENBARTH, T., AND SUNAR, B.
Wait a minute! a fast, cross-vm attack on aes. In Research in At-
tacks, Intrusions and Defenses, A. Stavrou, H. Bos, and G. Por-
tokalidis, Eds., vol. 8688 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer International Publishing, 2014, pp. 299–319.
13
[21] IRAZOQUI, G., I˙NCI˙, M. S., EISENBARTH, T., AND SUNAR,
B. Lucky 13 strikes back. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Sym-
posium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
(2015), ASIA CCS ’15, pp. 85–96.
[22] KAY, R. Intel And AMD: The Juggernaut Vs. The Squid. Forbes,
Inc., http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerkay/2014/11/
25/intel-and-amd-the-juggernaut-vs-the-squid,
2014. Published: 2014-11-25. Accessed: 2017-03-22.
[23] KLUG, B., AND SHIMPI, A. L. Qualcomm’s new snap-
dragon s4: Msm8960 & krait architecture explored.
http://www.anandtech.com/show/4940/qualcomm-
new-snapdragon-s4-msm8960-krait-architecture/2,
2011. Published: 2011-10-07. Accessed: 2017-03-22.
[24] LIPP, M. Cache attacks and rowhammer on arm. Mas-
ter’s thesis, Graz, University of Technology, 2016. https:
//www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-16/materials/eu-16-
Lipp-ARMageddon-How-Your-Smartphone-CPU-Breaks-
Software-Level-Security-And-Privacy-wp.pdf, Ac-
cessed: 2017-03-22.
[25] LIPP, M., GRUSS, D., SPREITZER, R., MAURICE, C., AND
MANGARD, S. Armageddon: Cache attacks on mobile de-
vices. In 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security
16) (Austin, TX, Aug. 2016), USENIX Association.
[26] LIU, F., YAROM, Y., GE, Q., HEISER, G., AND LEE, R. B.
Last-level cache side-channel attacks are practical. In IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy (San Jose, CA, US, may 2015).
[27] NEVE, M., AND SEIFERT, J.-P. Advances on access-driven
cache attacks on aes. In Selected Areas in Cryptography, E. Bi-
ham and A. Youssef, Eds., vol. 4356 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 147–162.
[28] OREN, Y., KEMERLIS, V. P., SETHUMADHAVAN, S., AND
KEROMYTIS, A. D. The spy in the sandbox: Practical cache
attacks in javascript and their implications. In Proceedings of the
22Nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security (2015), CCS ’15, pp. 1406–1418.
[29] OSVIK, D. A., SHAMIR, A., AND TROMER, E. Cache attacks
and countermeasures: The case of aes. In Topics in Cryptology –
CT-RSA 2006: The Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference
2006, San Jose, CA, USA, February 13-17, 2005. Proceedings
(Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006), Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 1–
20.
[30] PERCIVAL, C. Cache missing for fun and profit. In Proceedings
of BSDCan 2005 (2005).
[31] RISTENPART, T., TROMER, E., SHACHAM, H., AND SAVAGE,
S. Hey, you, get off of my cloud: Exploring information leakage
in third-party compute clouds. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (New
York, NY, USA, 2009), CCS ’09, ACM, pp. 199–212.
[32] SHIMPI, A. L., AND GREENHALGH, P. Answered by the
experts: Arms´ cortex a53 lead architect, peter greenhalgh.
http://www.anandtech.com/show/7591/answered-
by-the-experts-arms-cortex-a53-lead-architect-
peter-greenhalgh, 2013. Published: 2013-12-17. Accessed:
2017-03-22.
[33] WILLIAMSON, B. D. Line allocation in multi-level hierarchical
data stores. Patent US8271733 B2, ARM Limited, September
2012. https://www.google.com/patents/US8271733.
[34] YAROM, Y., AND FALKNER, K. Flush+reload: A high resolu-
tion, low noise, l3 cache side-channel attack. In 23rd USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (USENIX Security 14) (San Diego, CA, 2014),
USENIX Association, pp. 719–732.
[35] YAROM, Y., GENKIN, D., AND HENINGER, N. Cachebleed: A
timing attack on openssl constant time RSA. In Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2016 - 18th Interna-
tional Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 17-19, 2016,
Proceedings (2016), pp. 346–367.
[36] ZHANG, N., SUN, K., SHANDS, D., LOU, W., AND HOU, Y. T.
Truspy: Cache side-channel information leakage from the se-
cure world on arm devices. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2016/980, 2016. http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/980.
[37] ZHANG, X., XIAO, Y., AND ZHANG, Y. Return-oriented flush-
reload side channels on arm and their implications for android
devices. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (New York, NY, USA,
2016), CCS ’16, ACM, pp. 858–870.
[38] ZHANG, Y., JUELS, A., REITER, M. K., AND RISTENPART,
T. Cross-VM Side Channels and Their Use to Extract Private
Keys. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (New York, NY, USA, 2012), CCS
’12, ACM, pp. 305–316.
[39] ZHANG, Y., JUELS, A., REITER, M. K., AND RISTENPART, T.
Cross-tenant side-channel attacks in paas clouds. In Proceedings
of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security (New York, NY, USA, 2014), CCS ’14, ACM,
pp. 990–1003.
Notes
1To the best of our knowledge, there is no official public documen-
tation for the Qualcomm Krait 450. Table 1 lists the results of our
experiments as well as statements from online articles [23].
2The list of devices supported by DSTREAM can be retrieved
from ARM’s website at https://developer.arm.com/products/
software-development-tools/ds-5-development-studio/
resources/supported-devices.
3The timing measurement code can be retrieved from the GitHub
repository at https://github.com/IAIK/armageddon.
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